It contains all the ordinary elements of a mature legal system[16]: laws, courts, lawyers, judges,[16] a fully articulated legal code for the Latin Church and a code of law for the Eastern Catholic Churches,[17] principles of legal interpretation,[18] and coercive sanctions. [19] In most secular jurisdictions, there are no civil law ties. Those who are versed and qualified in canon law, and professors of canon law, are called canonists[20] (or colloquially canon lawyers). [21] Canon law as a sacred science is called canonical studies. In the Church of England, ecclesiastical courts, which adjudicated many matters such as disputes relating to marriage, divorce, wills and defamation, still have jurisdiction over certain ecclesiastical matters (e.g. discipline of clergy, change of church ownership and matters relating to cemeteries). Its distinct status dates back to the 11th century, when the Normans separated it from the mixed secular/religious county and local courts of the Saxons. Unlike other courts in England, the law used in ecclesiastical matters is, at least in part, a civil law system, not a common law system, although it is heavily regulated by parliamentary acts. Since the Reformation, ecclesiastical courts in England have been royal courts. The teaching of canon law at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge was abolished by Henry VIII.

Subsequently, practitioners were trained in civil law in ecclesiastical courts and received a Doctor of Civil Law (D.C.L.) from Oxford or an LL.D. from Cambridge. These lawyers (called „doctors“ and „civilians“) were centered in „Doctors Commons“, a few blocks south of St. Paul Cathedral in London, where they monopolized probate, matrimonial and admiralty cases until their jurisdiction was transferred to the common law courts in the mid-19th century. (Admiralty law was also based on civil law instead of common law, so it was also run by civilians.) The doctrine that the moral obligation of civil law depends to some extent on the intention of the legislature is sometimes the foundation of an extraordinary vision of modern civil law. This is nothing less than the conclusion that the regulations of virtually all modern legislative bodies have no force of binding conscience. Laws do not bind according to conscience, unless the legislature intends to bind them in this way; Today`s legislators cannot have such an intention, since they do not believe in the existence of a real moral obligation. That is the argument. Tanquerey rejects it on the grounds that, whatever their general and theoretical position vis-à-vis the reality of moral obligation, modern legislators want their ordinances to have the greatest possible force and authority; Therefore, they implicitly intend to be morally binding.

{11} Bouquillon is of the same opinion, stating that the legislature does not have to impose an express duty of conscience, but that it is sufficient that it intends to make a genuine order. {12} Lehmkuhl shares the same view as Tanquerey and Bouquillon, pointing out that if the express intention to bind conscience were essential, the laws promulgated by pagan rulers would be without coercion, which certainly contradicts the teaching of Scripture. {13} Suarez states that the intention of the legislature to enact a real law is sufficient and that the formal intention to bind in conscience is not necessary. He notes that legislators, especially unbelievers, rarely promote the issue of moral obligation. {14}Indeed, it seems that moral theologians generally think that an implicit intention is sufficient; That is, the intention that the decree has all the moral authority associated with a real law. Citizens may think, and their opinion may be correct, that state ownership of railways is less useful, less conducive to the common good, than private property. Nevertheless, they are morally obliged to accept the former for the same common good. Their refusal to do so would cause more serious damage to the Community than the continuation and their agreement to the agreement duly concluded.

This would mean that a group of individuals could at any time oppose any civil law settlement with which they disagree. The contradiction between this position and the requirements of right reason, natural law, the common good and individual well-being is obvious. This raises a very important question as to the form that the legislature should take in order to minimize an obligation that, by the nature of the object, would be serious. Let us suppose that he does not think at all about moral obligations, but simply thinks about passing a law. In this case, the law will bind in conscience, and the degree of obligation will be determined by the importance of the subject. This is the normal effect of a real law, and it is always produced as long as it is not positively excluded by the intention of the legislator. Let us suppose that the legislator expressly wants the law to be binding, but does not think about the degree of obligation. As in the first case, the obligation is determined by the object.

If the latter is of great importance, the law will be seriously binding. Therefore, a civil law of great importance is always binding under the threat of mortal sin, unless the legislator forms a positive intention to the contrary. A purely negative attitude towards the commitment has no effect on the obligation. {8}Of course, all ethical civil laws must be compatible with the moral law of nature. A law that violates a commandment of natural law has no moral force, however solemnly promulgated or severely sanctioned or vigorously enforced. Such a decree is not a law at all, but, as St. Thomas calls it, „a kind of violence.“ This is the rational basis of the doctrine enunciated in Sacred Scripture and taught by the Catholic Church without variation. According to this doctrine, civil law binds conscience as such; Not because it contains a natural or supernatural or essential law, nor because it contains a natural or essential law.

{2}The founders of our country – who themselves had a different religious background – knew that the best way to protect religious freedom was to keep the government out of religion. So they created the First Amendment – to guarantee the separation of church and state. This fundamental freedom is one of the main reasons why the United States has managed to avoid many of the religious conflicts that have torn so many other nations apart. What is less certain is the precise nature of the moral obligation of civil laws and the conditions under which they are obligatory in conscience. They are certainly binding insofar as they sanction or determine a higher law, natural or revealed, as when they prohibit murder and theft or establish property rights. They are certainly not binding if the laws are unjust, especially if they contradict the laws of God and the Church, if they do not emanate from legitimate authority, if they are not oriented towards the common good, and if they violate distributive justice. It does not change anything. In the United States, every individual has certain fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion.

These cannot be abolished, not even by the „majority rule“. Think of your friends who have a different faith or no religious belief at all. They would always feel excluded from their own final exercises. Or worse, they would feel that the school thought your religion was better than theirs. Place the shoe on the other foot for a second and think about how you would feel! The First Amendment Establishment Clause prohibits the government from promoting or establishing religion in any way. That is why we do not have an official religion of the United States. This means that the government cannot financially support any religion. That`s why many school voucher programs violate the installation clause – because they give taxpayer money to schools that promote religion. „Congress shall not enact any law respecting or prohibiting the free exercise of religion… – First Amendment to the United States Constitution Roman law distinguished between pacta nuda and treaties.